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We introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use them to explain
when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of R&D. We show that the second-
order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive
cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions
already derived in the literature. Finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative
and non-cooperative R&D, and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only
optimal for a very limited range of parameter values.
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considers two-stage oligopoly games in which first-stage actions affect second-stage
profits, and has frequently focused on symmetric equilibria where identical agents
take identical actions. The case where firms are identical ex ante is a natural starting
point for exploring these issues, since there is often no obvious way of justifying
initial differences between firms. To many authors it has seemed equally natural to
focus on symmetric outcomes, in which firms are identical ex post.
More recently, however, doubts have been expressed concerning the appropriateness
of ex post symmetry in such models. Amir and Wooders (1998), following Henriques
(1990), show in a non-cooperative game with R&D followed by output competition
that symmetric equilibria may be unstable, and they interpret such instability as
implying that the outcome will be asymmetric. Van Long and Soubeyran (1999)
explore the conditions under which symmetric firms which engage in a research joint
venture will choose an asymmetric pattern of R&D. Most notably, Salant and Shaffer
(1999) draw on the insight of Bergstrom and Varian (1985) that a mean-preserving
increase in the variance of marginal costs raises industry profits in Cournot
competition. Building on this, they show that firms may have an incentive to deviate
from a symmetric outcome. Referring in particular to the literature on R&D
cooperation stemming from d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), they assert that
bthis entire literature assumed (incorrectly) that it is joint-profit maximizing for the
cartel to treat identical members equally.Q (Salant and Shaffer (1999, p. 586).) They
also claim that there is a presumption that equilibria in such models will be
asymmetric.1
Notwithstanding these contributions, there does not appear to be a precise statement in
the literature of the conditions under which cooperative equilibria will be ex post
symmetric. The principal objective of this paper is to derive the exact restrictions which
imply that symmetry is optimal, and to compare them with conditions previously derived
by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin and Salant and Shaffer. In order to do this, we introduce
the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements as a convenient way of
summarising how changes in one choice variable affect the marginal contribution of
another to industry profits. This concept is potentially applicable to any context in which
profits are maximised by choice of more than one variable. In this paper we use it to
illuminate the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all
member firms.
Section 2 defines cooperative substitutes and complements, derives the second-order
conditions for symmetric cooperative outcomes in a general model, and relates them to
those of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin and Salant and Shaffer. Section 3 applies our results
to the linear-quadratic model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, and considers their
implications for the desirability of allowing R&D cooperation.1 Salant and Shaffer expand on their criticism of the literature on research joint ventures in their 1998 paper, and
their analysis has already been quoted with approval in at least two textbooks. See Martin (2002, p. 453) and Shy
(1996, p. 233).
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Consider a two-stage game in which first-stage investment in R&D by n ex ante
identical firms lowers their second-stage marginal costs of production. Let x =(x1,. . .,
xn) denote the vector of R&D investments. In this section we consider the cooperative
case, where firms agree to coordinate their investment levels in order to maximise
industry profits.2 We denote total industry profit by a scalar function C(x)=
P
kp
k(x).3
After the levels of R&D are chosen cooperatively, firms compete in a standard non-
cooperative fashion, choosing either outputs or prices. The function C(x) takes into
account the effects of R&D levels on the profits that will be earned in the subsequent
stage.4
2.1. Cooperative substitutes and complements
It turns out that understanding the conditions for maximisation of industry profits is
greatly helped by introducing a new concept which we call cooperative substitutability
and complementarity. We define this as follows:
Definition. The levels of R&D of firms i and j are cooperative substitutes if and only if the
cross-derivative Cij is negative, otherwise they are cooperative complements.
This definition is reminiscent of but not the same as the standard definition of strategic
substitutes and complements due to Bulow et al. (1985). What is at issue here is the effect
of one firm’s R&D on the marginal contribution of another firm’s R&D to industry profits.
By contrast, the concept of strategic substitutes refers to the cross-effect of one firm’s
R&D on the marginal profits of another firm.5 Strategic substitutability and complemen-
tarity is the natural concept to use in a non-cooperative context, and we show below that
the concept of cooperative substitutability and complementarity plays a similar role in the
cooperative context.
Precise conditions for the criteria for cooperative and strategic substitutability to
coincide are given in Appendix A. The most important case where this happens is that of a
symmetric equilibrium with only two firms. Intuitively, this is because the criterion for
strategic substitutability, pij
iN0, is inherently bilateral, even in an n-firm industry, since it
involves the effect of one firm’s R&D on the marginal profitability of another’s. By
contrast, the criterion for cooperative substitutability, Cij N0, can be written as
P
kpij
k,2 We follow much of the literature in using the terms bR&D cooperationQ and bresearch joint ventureQ
interchangeably, to describe a situation where firms first choose their R&D levels cooperatively and then compete
in the second stage, enjoying the same cost spillovers per unit of rival R&D as they would in the absence of
cooperation. Kamien et al. (1992) refer to this as an bR&D cartelQ, and use the term bRJV cartelQ for the case
where spillovers between cooperating firms are complete. The analysis of Section 2 applies to both cases.
3 Superscripts indicate the firm in question, and subscripts will subsequently be used to denote partial
derivatives. Thus Ci is the partial derivative of the industry profit function with respect to x
i, and Cij is the partial
derivative of Ci with respect to x
j.
4 This general specification of second-stage competition follows Leahy and Neary (1997).
5 Following Bulow et al. (1985, p. 494), xi is a strategic substitute for xj if and only if p ij
i is negative.
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coincide.6
2.2. Case I: ex ante equal treatment
The simplest way to model a cooperative equilibrium between ex ante identical firms,
and the one considered by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), is to confine attention to
cases where all firms invest equally in R&D. This is the natural starting point for
examining cooperation on R&D when side-payments between firms cannot be made.
Since the firms remain independent entities, and engage in non-cooperative competition in
the post-R&D stage, it is stretching credulity to assume that any firm would enter a
cooperative agreement which gave it lower profits than an ex ante identical rival firm.
Hence, in the absence of side payments, we assume that all firms invest equally in R&D
or, following Salant and Shaffer (1999), that they are subject to bequal treatmentQ.
Given the assumption of ex ante equal treatment, there is in effect only a single choice
variable: the level of R&D common to all firms. In other words, we confine attention to
R&D vectors in which all elements are equal, and seek that one which maximises industry
profits. The effect of an arbitrary change in all the xi on industry profits is given by
dC ¼
Xn
i
Cidx
i ð1Þ
Since xi =x and dxi=dx for all i, the first-order condition for an interior optimum (i.e., one
with xi N0, 8 i) is given by:
dC
dx
¼
Xn
i
Ci ¼ nCi ¼ 0 ð2Þ
Clearly this is identical to setting Ci equal to zero. The second-order condition is then that
no equiproportionate increase in the R&D levels of all firms (including firm i) can raise
Ci. We state this formally as follows:
Proposition 1. When firms are treated equally ex ante, the sufficient second-order
condition for a symmetric optimum is:
Cii þ n 1ð ÞC ij b0; 8i; j; i p j ð3Þ
This generalises the second-order condition first derived by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988, p. 1134, footnote 7) in the two-firm linear-quadratic case. Provided Eqs. (2) and (3)
hold, industry profits are maximised subject to the constraint that all firms have the same
level of R&D. Note that Eq. (3) gives the second-order condition in full. In particular, it is
not necessary that the second derivative of industry profits with respect to the R&D of a
single firm, Cii, be negative.6 With only two firms, the criterion for cooperative substitutability becomes pij
i +pij
j b0. By Young’s Theorem,
pij
j =pji
j, and by symmetry pji
j =pij
i , so the criterion reduces to 2pij
i b0, which is equivalent to the criterion for
strategic substitutability. See Appendix A for further details.
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Although all firms have identical profit functions (reflecting the facts that they have
identical technology and face identical demands), the research joint venture need not
treat all members equally. As emphasised by Salant and Shaffer (1998), this could arise
when side payments between firms are allowed, either via direct transfers or market-
swapping agreements.7 However, the fact that unequal treatment is possible does not
guarantee that it is optimal. In this section, we seek conditions under which an
unconstrained maximisation will exhibit the same level of R&D by all firms. We call this
situation equal treatment ex post.
As before, the first-order condition for maximisation of industry profits C(x) by choice
of x at a symmetric interior optimum is Ci=0 for all i. The crucial difference from the last
section comes in the second-order conditions, since now all elements of the R&D vector
can be changed independently. Let Cxx(x
o) be the square matrix of second-order partial
derivatives evaluated at a symmetric interior optimum, xo. The second-order sufficient
condition is that Cxx(x
o) is the matrix of a negative definite quadratic form. Therefore,
beginning with negative, the principal minors of the determinant jCxx(xo)j must alternate
in sign. Let the mth principal minor be obtained by deleting the last nm rows and
columns of jCxx(xo)j. Then the special structure of the matrix allows us to write the
second-order condition in a compact form:8
Proposition 2. When firms are not treated equally ex ante, the sufficient second-order
condition for a symmetric optimum is:
 1ð Þm Cii Cij
 m1
Cii þ m 1ð ÞCij

N0; 8mV n: ð4Þ
This condition is not very transparent. However, its economic implications are much
clearer when it is restated as follows:
Proposition 3. When firms are not treated equally ex ante, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the second-order condition, Eq.(4), to hold at a symmetric optimum are
given by:
Cii þ n 1ð ÞCij b 0; 8i; j; i p j ð5Þ
Cii Cij b0 8i; j; i p j ð6Þ
Proof. To prove necessity, we need to show that Eq. (4) implies Eqs. (5) and (6). Consider
therefore Eq. (4) for different values of m. Setting m equal to one gives what we can call
the no-own-deviation condition, Cii b0. Setting m equal to two implies that C ii
2NC ij
2,
which means that the absolute value of Cii exceeds that of Cij. Combined with the no-
own-deviation condition, this implies condition (6). Finally, setting m equal to n (nz2),7 The precise conditions under which such market-swapping agreements are sustainable have been investigated
by Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
8 See Dixit (1986), following Seade (1983).
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for all n. Hence, condition (4) as a whole implies condition (5).
Next, we need to prove sufficiency. Multiplying Eq. (6) by n1 and adding to Eq.
(5) gives the no-own-deviation condition, Cii b0. This plus Eq. (5) implies that
Cii +(m1)Cij is negative for all mVn. Combining this with Eq. (6) implies condition
(4). 5
Conditions (5) and (6) have a nice intuitive interpretation. For a symmetric choice of
R&D to maximise industry profits, it must not be possible for any one firm or any
combination of firms to deviate profitably. Proposition 3 shows that Eqs. (5) and (6) are
necessary and sufficient for the second-order conditions to hold, implying that any small
deviation from a symmetric optimum can be expressed as a linear combination of only two
primitive deviations.9
The first kind of primitive deviation is a uniform increase in the R&D of all firms. This
changes the first-order condition for optimal cooperative choice of R&D by a typical firm,
Ci=0, by an amount equal to Cii +(n1)Cij. To ensure that this deviation is unprofitable
requires that condition (5) hold. We have already seen in Proposition 1 that this condition
is sufficient for a symmetric optimum when firms are treated equally ex ante, the case
considered by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin. A different interpretation can be given to this
condition by recalling our definition of cooperative substitutability and complementarity.
The condition in Eq. (5) implies that Cij cannot exceed Cii / (n1). Since Cii must be
negative at the optimum, this means that Cij cannot be too positive, or, in words, that the
optimum should not exhibit too much cooperative complementarity. Henceforward we call
Eq. (5) the Restricted Cooperative Complementarity or RCC Condition. Too much
cooperative complementarity would imply that a uniform increase in R&D by all firms (a
symmetric deviation from a symmetric equilibrium) would raise the marginal contribution
to industry profits of every firm, implying that the initial allocation did not maximise
industry profits.
The second kind of primitive deviation is a reallocation of R&D between any group of
firms, holding their total R&D constant. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the group
consists of the first m firms, where m can take any value between 2 and n. Using Dxi to
denote the change in the R&D of firm i, we therefore have:Xm
1
Dx j ¼ 0 and Dxh ¼ 0; mb hV n: ð7Þ
We can see immediately that this change does not affect the marginal contribution to
industry profits of the R&D of a typical firm h outside the group:
DCh ¼
Xm
j¼1
ChjDx
j ¼ Cij
Xm
j¼1
Dx j ¼ 0; mbhVn: ð8Þ
Here we use the fact that, for small deviations from a symmetric equilibrium, all the cross-
derivatives are equal: Chj=Cij, for all h, i and j. Next, consider the effect on the marginal9 Note that the no-own-deviation condition, Cii b0, is not part of the conditions in Proposition 3, since it is
implied both by Eq. (4) and by Eqs. (5) and (6).
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arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to a firm which reduces its R&D.) The first-order
condition for the R&D of firm i, Ci =0, changes by an amount equal to:
DCi ¼ CiiDxi þ
Xm
j pi
CijDx
j
¼ CiiDxi þCij
Xm
j pI
Dx j
¼ Cii Cij
 
Dxi ð9Þ
where the final step uses Eq. (7). To ensure that this deviation reduces firm i’s marginal
contribution to industry profits requires that the term in brackets be negative, i.e., that
condition (6) hold. This implies that Cij cannot be less than Cii. This means that Cij
cannot be too negative, or, in words, that the optimum should not exhibit too much
cooperative substitutability. Hence we refer to this as the Restricted Cooperative
Substitutability or RCS Condition. Too much cooperative substitutability would imply
that, following a reallocation of R&D between a group of firms (an asymmetric deviation
from a symmetric equilibrium), the fall in R&D by some of those firms would raise the
marginal contribution to industry profits of firms that increased their R&D sufficiently to
offset the negative own effect on marginal profitability Cii, implying that the initial
allocation did not maximise industry profits.
2.4. The Salant–Shaffer approach: no two-firm deviations allowed
We next want to explore how the second-order conditions derived in the last section
relate to the approach of Salant and Shaffer (1999). They do not explicitly discuss second-
order conditions for a symmetric optimum. Instead, they explore the conditions under
which a small deviation from a symmetric optimum by two firms, keeping their total R&D
fixed, leads to an increase in industry profits. In this section, we focus on Salant and
Shaffer’s central analytic contribution, a sufficient condition for optimal first-stage
behaviour to be asymmetric when asymmetries in marginal costs are costly to introduce,
given by Eq. (7) in their paper. We first derive the Salant–Shaffer condition and then relate
it to the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum derived in the last section.10
Following Salant and Shaffer, we seek a condition for a reallocation of investment
between two firms, keeping the sum of marginal costs constant, to raise industry profits.
Consider what they call the biso-sum locusQ, x2=g(x1; x*), which gives combinations of x110 Because of our C(x) notation, which is not in Salant and Shaffer (1999), we are able to present their condition
in a more compact and general form than in their paper. Whereas they restrict attention to homogeneous-product
Cournot competition, our results also apply, as already noted, when goods are symmetrically differentiated and
when firms compete in either a Cournot or Bertrand manner.
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their R&D levels at a symmetric level x*. When firm 1 invests x1, firm 2 invests x2=g(x1;
x*) and the other n2 firms invest x*, industry profits can be written as:
C˜ x1; x4
  ¼ C x1; g x1; x4 ; x4; . . . ; x4 : ð10Þ
Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to x1 and evaluating at the symmetric R&D vector x*
gives:
C˜ V x4; x4ð Þ ¼ C1 x4ð Þ þ gVC2 x4ð Þ ¼ 0; ð11Þ
The expression in Eq. (11) is zero since C1(x*)=C2(x*) (because x* is symmetric) and
gV(x*; x*)=1 (as shown by Salant and Shaffer). This is a local minimum when:
C˜W x4; x4ð Þ ¼ C11 x4 Þþ gV½C12ðx4 ÞþC21ðx4 Þ	 þ ðgVÞ2C22ðx4 Þ þ gWC2ðx4 ÞN0:

ð12Þ
This expression can be simplified since C11(x*)=C22(x*) (because x* is symmetric)
and C12(x*)=C21(x*). As in Salant and Shaffer, denote by x
P =(xC,. . ., xC) the
investment combination that maximises industry profit subject to the ex ante equal-
treatment constraint that all firms must invest equally. Then the Salant and Shaffer
condition can be written as:
C˜W xC; xC
  ¼ 2 C11 xP C12 xP  þ gWC2 xP N0: ð13Þ
When this condition holds, a deviation from symmetry raises industry profits.
We now show that the Salant–Shaffer condition is incompatible with the second-order
condition:
Proposition 4. The Salant–Shaffer condition, Eq.(13), is the converse of the RCS
condition, Eq.(6), at a symmetric interior equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is immediate from inspection of Eq. (13). Since the choice of firms 1 and
2 was arbitrary, we can reexpress Eq. (13) in terms of any two firms i and j. At the
optimum, C2 is zero, and so Eq. (13) can hold if and only if Eq. (6) does not hold. 5
It is straightforward to extend this analysis to the maximisation of social surplus which
Salant and Shaffer also consider in section II.B of their paper. Here too the Salant–Shaffer
condition and the second-order condition for a welfare maximum cannot both hold at a
symmetric interior equilibrium.
While we have shown that Eqs. (13) and (4) are incompatible, it does not follow that a
violation of Eq. (13) implies that Eq. (4) holds. A violation of the Salant–Shaffer condition
is necessary but not sufficient for the second-order condition to hold, as our Proposition 3
shows. The Salant and Shaffer approach is to consider movements away from a symmetric
equilibrium on a path along which the investments of all but two firms are constant. But
there is no justification for restricting attention to such paths in an n-firm problem. What is
required instead is to consider all possible deviations from a candidate optimum, and this
is exactly what the standard second-order condition does.
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In this section we show how the general results of the previous section specialise to the
linear-quadratic example first explored by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin. Focusing on an
explicit example allows us to relate the general results to underlying parameters in a more
transparent way. It also allows us to address the quantitative importance of the different
conditions. Our strategy is to derive the second-order conditions for a symmetric
cooperative equilibrium and then to show how they relate to the Salant–Shaffer condition
and to the stability condition for the non-cooperative equilibrium.
3.1. The model
As in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, Salant and Shaffer (1998) and many other papers,
we consider a homogeneous-product duopoly where firms first engage in cost-reducing
R&D and then in Cournot competition. With n firms, the model is most easily solved by
working with variables for a typical firm and for the industry as a whole: we denote these
by xi and Xu
P
kx
k respectively for R&D, and by qi and Qu
P
kq
k for output. Otherwise
the model is standard. Costs of R&D are quadratic, equal to c(xi)2/2 for firm i. Production
costs are independent of output and fall linearly in own and rival R&D. This in turn
implies that they are decreasing in a weighted average of own and industry R&D:
ci ¼ c0  h xi þ b
X
k p i
xk
 !
¼ c0  h 1 bð Þxi þ bX
 ð14Þ
where b is the spillover coefficient. Finally, demand is linear: p =abQ. We assume that
Auac0N0, 0VbV1 and c N0.
In the second stage, firms choose outputs independently to maximise operating profits
(pci)qi. This yields first-order conditions which equate marginal revenue to marginal
cost for each firm: pbqi =ci. Summing over all firms we can solve for industry output as
a function of industry R&D:
Q ¼ 1
nþ 1ð Þb nAþ h 1þ n 1ð Þbf gX½ 	 ð15Þ
This in turn allows us to solve for the output of firm i, which is always increasing in ownR&D
but increasing in rival R&D (i.e., industryR&D for given xi) only for high spillovers (b N1/2):
qi ¼ 1
nþ 1ð Þb Aþ h nþ 1ð Þ 1 bð Þx
i þ h 2b  1ð ÞX  ð16Þ
In the first stage, the RJV chooses the levels of R&D to maximise industry profits:
C ¼
Xn
k¼1
kk ; where kk ¼ b qk 2  1
2
c xk
 2 ð17Þ
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Ci ¼ 2
nþ 1 h nþ 1ð Þ 1 bð Þq
i þ 2b  1ð ÞQ  cxi ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; n ð18Þ
These can then be solved for the equilibrium values of R&D.
3.2. Second-order conditions at a symmetric equilibrium
If the RJV is to maximise profits, the second-order conditions with respect to R&D
levels must hold at the optimum. Let us assume now that the equilibrium is symmetric. To
find the second-order conditions, specialise the general expressions from the last section to
the linear-quadratic case and then evaluate them using the derivatives of Eq. (18). The
detailed derivations are given in Appendix B. We show there that Cij is negative, and so
R&D levels are cooperative substitutes, if and only if the spillover parameter is less than a
half. As for the RCC condition (Eq. (5) specialised to the linear-quadratic case), it
becomes:11
Cii þ n 1ð ÞCij b 0Z g b 1
2
nþ 1
1þ n 1ð Þb
	2"
ð19Þ
Here, following Leahy and Neary (1996), we use g to denote h2/bc, which can be
interpreted as the relative effectiveness of R&D. Finally, the RCS condition, Eq. (6),
becomes:
Cii Cij b 0Z g b 1
2 1 bð Þ2 ð20Þ
Note that this is independent of n.
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate conditions (19) and (20) in {g,b} space, for the case of two firms
(n=2).12 Both conditions can be explained intuitively in terms of the trade-off between the
relative effectiveness of R&D and the degree of cooperative substitutability. An increase in
g makes it more likely that both parts of the second-order conditions will be violated. An
increase in b raises the degree to which R&D levels are cooperative complements. Hence,
starting from a point where the RCC condition just holds, an increase in g must be
compensated by a fall in b (i.e., a decrease in cooperative complementarity) to restore the
condition. Thus the locus corresponding to the RCC condition is downward sloping in Fig.
1. By contrast, starting from a point where the RCS condition just holds, an increase in g
must be offset by an increase in b, and so the locus is upward-sloping.
Given the configuration of the loci in Fig. 1, we can now consider the different regions
in Fig. 2. In Region A, above the locus corresponding to the RCC condition, an
equiproportionate increase in R&D levels raises profits without bound. Hence this region11 Because of the special functional forms used, both parts of the second-order conditions depend on parameters
only. Hence if they hold at one point they must hold at all. By contrast, in the general model of Section 2, the local
results need not hold globally.
12 Salant and Shaffer (1998) present similar diagrams drawn in {1/g,b} space. Our perspective seems more
natural since the vertical axis is bounded at zero, the case where R&D is either prohibitively expensive or has no
effect on production costs, and so its equilibrium level is always zero.
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difference between them to be considered in the next section) are consistent with a
symmetric optimum if the firms are treated equally ex ante. However, if they are not, then0.00
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be increased by reallocating R&D between the two firms. In that case, as Salant and
Shaffer have argued, the pattern of R&D levels which maximises profits for the RJV is
asymmetric. Finally, in Region D the optimum is symmetric irrespective of whether or not
firms are treated equally ex ante.
3.3. Comparison with the non-cooperative equilibria
The preceding discussion might suggest that asymmetric RJV’s are important for a
wide range of parameters. However, we have to recall that this issue is of theoretical and
policy interest in the first place only because of the potential role of RJV’s in leading to
improved outcomes relative to non-cooperative equilibria. For the comparison to be
meaningful, the non-cooperative equilibrium itself must be a meaningful one. In
particular, it should satisfy the standard stability conditions for a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium.13
The stability conditions for this game have been derived in Leahy and Neary
(1997, Appendix), drawing on Dixit (1986), Hahn (1962) and Seade (1980). As shown
there, for b less than a half, stability of the non-cooperative game requires that the
following condition hold:
bb1=2 : piii  piij b0Z gb
nþ 1
2 1 bð Þ n n 1ð Þb½ 	 ð21Þ
Following our earlier discussion of the cooperative case, we can call this condition
bRestricted Strategic SubstitutabilityQ. Conversely, for b greater than a half, stability
requires a different condition which we can call bRestricted Strategic Com-
plementarityQ:14
bN1=2 : piii þ n 1ð Þpiijb0Z gb
nþ 1ð Þ2
2 1þ n 1ð Þb½ 	 n n 1ð Þb½ 	 ð22Þ
These conditions are illustrated for n equal to two in Figs. 1 and 2.15 The small
region denoted by C in Fig. 2 shows the parameter combinations which violate the
RCS condition but satisfy the non-cooperative stability condition. Only in region C
can asymmetric cooperative equilibria be compared with symmetric non-cooperation.
For higher values of n, the conclusions from Fig. 2 are reinforced. As already noted, the
RCS condition, the boundary between regions C and D, is independent of n. By contrast,
as n rises the RCC condition becomes more demanding for b greater than a half. From Eq.
(19), an increase in n reduces the permissible level of cooperative complementarity,
leading the curve to pivot clockwise around the point where b equals a half. As a result
region A expands at the expense of region D. Finally, the curve representing the non-13 An alternative interpretation, explored by Amir and Wooders (1998), is to assume that, when the symmetric
Nash equilibrium in R&D is unstable, the outcome will be an asymmetric equilibrium.
14 These conditions are both necessary and sufficient when n is even. When n is odd, condition (21) is only
sufficient for stability.
15 Henriques (1990) was the first to explore the stability of non-cooperative equilibria in this model. The case
corresponding to the parameter values considered by her is denoted by point H in Fig. 1.
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becomes very large, Eq. (21) coincides with Eq. (20) so this region vanishes, and there are
no parameter combinations where a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium can be
compared with an asymmetric RJV.4. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the choice of R&D levels in an industry where
firms cooperate to form a research joint venture. We introduce the concept of
cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions
for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D for all member firms. Our
principal result, Proposition 3, shows that the second-order condition for a symmetric
choice of R&D is equivalent to requiring that only two kinds of deviation from the
optimum are unprofitable. First is a uniform increase in the R&D of all firms. This
is the sole deviation which must be unprofitable if firms are required to be treated equa-
lly ex ante, perhaps because side payments are ruled out, the case considered by
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). For this deviation to be unprofitable requires a
restriction on the degree of cooperative complementarity. The second kind of deviation
which must be unprofitable is a reallocation of R&D between an arbitrary subset of
firms, holding constant their total level of R&D. For this deviation to be unprofitable
requires a restriction on the degree of cooperative substitutability, which we show is
the converse of the condition derived by Salant and Shaffer (1999) in the case of a two-
firm deviation.
In addition to considering the conditions for a profit-maximising cooperative
outcome to be symmetric, we compare these conditions with those (already in the
literature) for a non-cooperative equilibrium to be stable. In so far as these models are
relevant to policy, it is because they throw light on the issue of whether cooperative
research joint ventures should be allowed in preference to a non-cooperative
oligopolistic equilibrium. Hence it is also necessary to consider the circumstances in
which such an equilibrium makes sense, by checking its second-order and stability
conditions (see Henriques, 1990 and Amir and Wooders, 1998). We show that, for a
widely used example, the comparison between an asymmetric cooperative outcome
and a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium is relevant for a very small range of
parameters.
How do our results relate to the critique of the literature on R&D cooperation presented
by Salant and Shaffer (1998, 1999)? Whereas they claim to find berror Q in much of the
literature on two-stage investment games (including our 1997 paper), we do not assert that
their specific statements are false.16 Rather, we show that they are true but incomplete. In16 Our criticisms apply to Salant and Shaffer’s Sections II.B and III and not to their Section II.A, which discusses
games where asymmetries in marginal costs are costless (such as learning by doing or resource extraction with
depletion effects). Clearly a symmetric equilibrium is not profit-maximising in such models (since it violates the
second-order condition), and Salant and Shaffer do not present any examples from the literature which suggest
otherwise.
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optimum to be profitable, we show that all possible deviations from a candidate symmetric
optimum can be expressed as combinations of only two primitive deviations, one of which
is the Salant–Shaffer type.
Where we disagree with Salant and Shaffer is in the interpretation of their results,
as for example when they say of research joint ventures: bthere is a strong
presumption that nonidentical actions by identical agents in the first stage are
required to maximize social surplus and industry profit.Q (Salant and Shaffer, 1999,
p. 586, emphasis in original). But in models where asymmetries in marginal costs
are costly, there is no presumption that symmetric outcomes will fail to maximise
profits or social welfare. On the contrary, they will do so locally, provided the
objective function is sufficiently concave in the neighbourhood of the symmetric
optimum, which in these models usually means, provided the investment or R&D
cost function is sufficiently convex. How much convexity is required depends on the
second-order conditions, no more and no less. Of course, to determine whether any
point is a global optimum requires information about the objective function
everywhere, but the Salant–Shaffer condition which (like the second-order conditions
as a whole) is evaluated locally has nothing new to say on this. Hence, provided the
appropriate second-order conditions are satisfied, all the conclusions in the extensive
literature on research joint ventures are immune to the criticisms of Salant and
Shaffer.
In conclusion, the concept of cooperative substitutes which we have introduced is
likely to have other applications. Here we have considered only the case where
cooperation occurs in the first stage of a two-stage game. However, it is also relevant
in cases where cooperation is permanent, such as multi-plant or multi-product firms.
For example, economies of scope in production of two goods by a multi-product firm
tends to make them cooperative complements, although this effect may be offset if
they are also substitutes in demand. In addition, while we have considered only the
case where the cooperative includes all firms in the industry, it is also relevant to
cooperation between a subset of firms. In that case the concept of cooperative
substitutes is relevant to allocation within the cooperative, whereas the standard
concept of strategic substitutes is relevant to external competition.Acknowledgements
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an anonymous referee for helpful comments.Appendix A. Cooperative versus strategic substitutes and complements
Unlike the definition of strategic substitutes and complements, the definition of
cooperative substitutes and complements is symmetric: if xi is a cooperative substitute
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types of substitutability and complementarity, recall that industry profits equal the sum
of the profits of all n firms: C=
P
kp
k. Differentiating with respect to the R&D of firm i
gives:
Ci ¼
X
k
pki ð23Þ
In a symmetric equilibrium, this simplifies to:
Ci ¼ pii þ n 1ð Þpij ð24Þ
(where we use the fact that pi
j =pj
i). The own second derivative of industry profits
therefore becomes:
Cii ¼
X
k
pkii ð25Þ
or with symmetry:
Cii ¼ piii þ n 1ð Þpijj ð26Þ
Finally, the cross derivative of industry profits, which is negative if and only if R&D
levels are cooperative substitutes, equals:
Cij ¼
X
k
pkij ð27Þ
or with symmetry:
Cij ¼ 2piij þ n 2ð Þphij ð28Þ
To derive Eq. (28) from Eq. (27), we use the facts that pij
i =pji
j from symmetry; that
pij
k =pij
h for all h and k not equal to i or j, from symmetry; and that pji
j =pij
j from Young’s
Theorem. Crucially, however, pij
i is not equal to pij
h when h, i and j are all different.
This is true even in the linear-quadratic case: see below.
Eq. (28) shows that the criteria for the two forms of substitutability do not coincide,
even when we consider only symmetric equilibria. They coincide in two special cases.
The first is where there are only two firms. In that case the final term in Eq. (28) vanishes
and the criterion for cooperative substitutes, Cij b0, has the same sign as that for
strategic substitutes, pij
i b0, irrespective of the functional forms and of the nature of
competition. The second is the linear-quadratic model of Section 3, where, for all n,
R&D levels are both cooperative and strategic substitutes if and only if b is less than
one half. To see this, consider first the criterion for strategic substitutability, obtained
by differentiating twice the expression in Eq. (17) for a single firm’s profits. This
gives:
piij ¼
2
nþ 1ð Þ2 gc 2b  1ð Þ n n 1ð Þb½ 	 ð29Þ
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calculation leads to the effects of a change in one firm’s R&D on the responsiveness of a
second firm’s profits to a change in a third firm’s R&D:
phij ¼
2
nþ 1ð Þ2 gc 2b  1ð Þ
2 ð30Þ
Surprisingly, this is always positive, strictly so except when b equals a half. (Note also that
it differs from Eq. (29).) Finally, substituting from Eqs. (29) and (30) into Eq. (28) gives
the expression for Cij derived by a different route in Eq. (32) below. Like Eq. (29), this is
negative if and only if b is less than one half, confirming that the criteria for strategic and
cooperative substitutability coincide in this case.Appendix B. Second-order conditions in the linear-quadratic case
It turns out to be most convenient to derive the cross second derivative first. Inspecting
the first-order condition (18) and the expressions for industry and firm output (Eqs. (15)
and (16)), we can see that the cross derivative is simply the partial derivative of Ci with
respect to industry R&D X. Thus differentiating Eq. (18) gives:
Cij ¼ BCi
BX
¼ 2
nþ 1 h

nþ 1ð Þ 1 bð Þ Bq
i
BX
þ 2b  1ð Þ dQ
dX
	
ð31Þ
Calculating Bqi/BX and dQ/dX from Eqs. (16) and (15), respectively, and substituting into
Eq. (31) gives the cooperative substitutability term:
Cij ¼ 2
nþ 1ð Þ2 gc 2b  1ð Þ nþ 2 1 bð Þ½ 	 ð32Þ
This is clearly negative, and so R&D levels are cooperative substitutes, if and only if b is
less than a half, as stated in the text.
Next the own second derivative, which must be negative for the no-own-deviation
condition to hold, can be written as follows:
Cii ¼ BCi
Bxi
þ BCi
BX
¼ 2h 1 bð Þ Bq
i
BX
 c þCij ð33Þ
Subtracting Eq. (31) from this and substituting for Bqi/BX gives the RCS condition:
Cii Cij ¼ 2gc 1 bð Þ2  c b 0 ð34Þ
Finally the RCC condition can be calculated in a similar way:
Cii þ n 1ð ÞCij ¼ 2gc
"
1þ n 1ð Þb
nþ 1
#2
 c b 0 ð35Þ
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